

rather than nuclear detonations, the Soviet leadership would be getting a signal that the West had for the moment chosen to try to keep the war nonnuclear. (This of course assumes that the Soviet attackers also would have elected not to use nuclear weapons, which would similarly be a signal to the West.) The pattern of where the cruise missiles landed would similarly be a signal of what the geographical limits to the exchange were slated to be.

In summary, it is entirely possible that preoccupation with the SALT process has led to an exaggeration of the significance of monitoring and prior limitation of military arsenals, as compared with the possibilities of mutual restraint in the use of such arsenals. Cruise missiles may hurt the former, but they may lend themselves to the latter.

Deterrence by Punishment: Nuclear Proliferation?

The arms controllers' concern about cruise missiles is that any shorter-range conventional missiles might be turned into longer-range nuclear missiles, but normally this concern has not led to a fear that the United States would be equipped with a menacing first-strike counterforce capability. The fear has instead been expressed that cruise missiles will increase the temptations toward nuclear proliferation. The Russians' opposition to the deployment of such weapons has focused particularly on GLCMs, which they have sometimes claimed, in a rare display of humor, stood for "German-launched cruise missiles." The allies of the United States, for reasons noted above, might have a very serious claim to such weapons. If a very accurate conventional cruise missile could hit key targets to frustrate a Soviet tank advance, who could be against letting the Germans or French or South Koreans (or Communist Chinese) have access to it sooner or later?

The problem is similar to the proliferation question posed by the spread of nuclear power reactors around the world. What is useful for peaceful nuclear purposes can also be used to make nuclear warheads; what is useful for delivering conventional warheads to target can also be used to deliver nuclear warheads. The United States finds it easier to withhold sensitive peaceful nuclear power facilities where the economies of scale are great, for then it is plausible that an entire portion of the nuclear fuel cycle (uranium enrichment, for example) should remain in American hands. The need to question the motives or reliability of the

foreign governments is avoided. When the economies of scale are not so strong, however, it becomes much more difficult to hold back what is so sensitively dual purpose.

Similarly, when B-52s were used for tactical purposes in Vietnam, this did not produce a chorus of requests for such weapons from the NATO states, South Korea, Australia, or Thailand. Because the economies of scale in managing a weapon system like the B-52 are enormous, however, the United States could have diverted any such request by noting that the entire array of these bombers could be managed much more effectively if kept within the U.S. Air Force. Cruise missiles, by contrast, will probably not be governed by such economies of scale and may lend themselves to efficient deployment and operation by separate national forces.

One way to avert concern about nuclear proliferation would be to limit the Western investment to sea-based cruise missiles, deployed in waters off Western Europe and dedicated to the tactical purpose of NATO, like the currently dedicated U.S. Navy Poseidon submarines. There should be less concern about the development of a "German-launched cruise missile" when the vehicle is not physically deployed in close proximity to non-American forces.¹⁵

Submarine-based cruise missiles would be just as invulnerable to Soviet attack as the Poseidon, and would permit absolute maintenance of American control, thus lessening concern about nuclear proliferation. Yet this possibly would mean that they are also as unsatisfactory as the Poseidon for the calming of European apprehension about U.S. support and Soviet intentions in Europe. The claim has been made that the Poseidon submarines are "not visible enough." Submarine-based forces could surely be made visible by commissioning the production of documentary films for European television that would show the crews at their controls and test-firings of ballistic and cruise missiles from below the surface. Periodic port calls of such submarines could also be arranged to remind everyone that a number of such vessels were in the vicinity.

This approach still might not assuage the European planners' concern, however. At the heart of their complaint about the Poseidon submarines'

¹⁵ This point leads to the final rub on the arms control and strategic impact of deploying cruise missiles. Ground-launched cruise missiles pose the greater threat of a tendency toward nuclear proliferation. Yet, as part of maintaining the peace in Europe, the United States has all along probably (without ever fully admitting it) welcomed some of this tendency toward proliferation in this area, at least by the British and French.

visibility is that the missiles have not been deployed into a position by itself would increase the likelihood of their use. Since the 1979 European forces would in effect have to trip over them in the process of a forward move into West Germany and Western Europe. This presence of American tactical nuclear weapons in the combat zone (along with the existence of the British and French nuclear weapons forces) might make it impossible for an American president to limit nuclear escalation to European territory. Soviet planners simply cannot be as sure of a U.S. president's command and control over nuclear weapons use when the weapons are land-based in the path of a Soviet tank advance, instead of sea-based in the waters off Europe. In short, modern strategy may imply that the most important characteristic of some weapons may not be what targets they could hit, but where they are based.

Cruise missiles could thus contribute to preventing a Soviet conquest of Western Europe in two drastically different ways. First, if effective, they might allow the crippling of the Soviet military potential in a very clean and nonescalatory way by delivering nonnuclear warheads with great accuracy to military targets upon which the Soviet ground advance depended. The second way is enormously different, based on almost opposite premises about the likelihood of escalation. The presence of cruise missiles with *nuclear* warheads in the NATO area would reinforce Soviet expectations that any war would be messy and likely to escalate, that Western Europe and much of Eastern Europe as well would be severely damaged in the process of any struggle, and that the ensuing escalatory process might well lead to all-out war. This would be classic deterrence by punishment rather than deterrence by denial.

Future Theater Negotiations

Taking all considerations into account (rather than adopting a partial definition of arms control that focuses only on formal negotiations or verifiability of totals), one might reasonably conclude that the cruise missile is not a disaster and might even be more of a solution than a problem. If the primary goal is to deter war in the first place, as well as reduce the costs of war and peacetime preparedness, the cruise missile in some of its possible deployments may contribute to the end goals of arms control.

Yet one must ask whether negotiated agreements might not offer better possibilities than a simple advance with deployments in the absence of

arms control: TOWARD ... negotiations and agreements.¹⁶ Such agreements, if properly formulated, might deliver a still greater contribution to the goals just noted. The NATO decision in December 1979 to deploy GLCMs in Europe also proposed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on limitations on both sides' theater nuclear weapons.

Negotiations about theater nuclear systems such as cruise missiles would be envisaged in at least four forms. The first would be to handle the more issue within a revived SALT process. This could be done by treating such vehicles as strategic in potential and recognizing that the primary Western capability in this area will remain American for the short run—but perhaps not in the longer run, if France or other U.S. allies develop their own cruise missile technology. Participation in these negotiations would remain limited to the United States and Soviet Union. (This in effect is the negotiating approach endorsed at the December 1979 NATO Council meeting.) The negotiators might have to include in the American quota of theater forces those of American allies such as Britain and France. Such a formula would address Soviet arguments about functional parity and noncircumvention while allowing Paris and London to feel relatively independent. However, it might meet resistance in the U.S. Congress even if the administration in power accepted it.

Second, one could alternatively pull cruise missiles (especially since their warheads can be conventional as well as nuclear) into the MBFR negotiations, which heretofore have been mainly devoted to discussions of conventional arms. An obvious criticism of this option is that it would tend to make an already complicated MBFR much more complicated. The MBFR discussions have not progressed to a point that would allow a breakthrough on theater nuclear weapons, but instead have been bogged down in complicated arguments about asymmetries at the conventional level. However, I would argue that the ultimate source of the arms control problem here is at the conventional weapons level, and thus MBFR might be the *logically* appropriate place to do the negotiating. To reduce tank totals might be the best first step toward reducing theater nuclear weapons totals, or even avoiding a heavy investment in conventionally armed cruise missiles.¹⁷

16. See Coit Dennis Blacker and Farooq Hussain, "European Theater Nuclear Forces," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1980, pp. 32-37, for a valuable overview of the arms control issues in the TNF deployment.

17. A very imaginative set of possibilities for stabilizing the European confrontation can be found in J. I. Coffey, *New Approaches to Arms Reduction in Europe*, Adelphi Paper 105 (London: IISS, 1974).

Tripwire + Vulnerability

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- ① Berlin, move of bombers to Britain:
"once the bombs were ^{at} exposed forward bases it was virtually inevitable that the Pps would not approve the use in the event of war."

- ② see Newsome on Gulf, For Paul Simon 1981
Now can be as good a Tripwire as bases: (combination of threat and vulnerability)

see P/CM
N-bomb
AOM.

- ③ "head-based minutes"
"Must have in US if we want Eur to have" Maj. Salter ^{testifies}

Also, US has at stake: "300,000 in Europe" (all); Troops to Eur; MX...